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FOREWORD

The Department of Philosophy invita ita friends to a feaak
The richeat of all fielda ia Religion. The deepest p m b h ia
W When a student underhkes to find himeelf in this
ocean the teschers in the D e p d e n t BEI made glad.
Mr. Cobb puta to sea and givss us an fntendng amount
of his vonge. There are t h m very intereathg traits in thh
&my. Mr. Cobb's thinking folIowa the highway of human
thinking. Not o w does Mr. Cobb permit the emotiom to
otwure the goal. He reache8 port, docks his craft, and offera
b i ~log to the public. That Mr. Cobb will modify this atatement in years to come is to be expected. The important feae
ture is that he puta to sea. So much emphasis ier put upon
the visible that many wonder whether there be other than the
visible. This attitude has become a teknik and is the source
of our ~ u ~ ~andi uncertainty.
t g
Weitqabright omen thata@kdpmg~roung~findmr
M m d f the grip of the profound. W e aay, bon voyage
H.E W ~ H B
rnartment of ~hil&phy
University of North Clurolina
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PREFACE

"A Study of God and Values" woutd be an appropriate
title for a comprehensive and authoribtive achievement of
a l i f e h e but might seem p ~ ~ m p h m ufor
H an easay by r
student. I acknow~edgathe dhmpancy between the smpe
and depth of theology, on the one hand, and the experience
and capacity of the wribr, on the other; but I cannot, merely
on that amount, ignore the conclusions of my own inteliigence.
AA a matter of fact, it was the c o d c t bebeen a critical
diiilsatkhctionwith orthodox theology and an inherent need for
d i g i o n which first turned m y intmah to philosophy. Hence
it is but natural that my first adventurn in philamphy is in
search of a theology which will aatiafy the demands of the
heart, enrich and justify human activity, and yet not offend
the keenest intellect.
The conception of this, my first p h i l w p h i d offspring, h~
been i m p m a t e d with the fertile suggeationa and atimuhkd
by the intellectual auhtic of Prof. H. H.Will-,
whom I
take thia opportunity to thank. His challenging remarks to
the effect that there is "no Ionger any individual big emu&
to be a theologian" and that ''science today knows the structure of everything except logic and religion," i m h d of dfacouraging me, have spurred me on.

CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
"To-day there is but one religione dogma in debate: What da you
mean by 'Gwl'lM-A. N. W h i b h d , R s l i m d# t h M a w .

Much as we might like to take the whole of religion as our
province, an adequate treatment of it would be impmib1e in
the time and space at our disposal. An essay of this kind
must be limited to the esmntiah. The characbristic and
emntid element of religion, say most theologians, is the
conception of God. Some of the more recent philmphem,
however, declare the asence of religion to be connected in
mme way with values, value-judgments, or evaluation. Hence,
without attempting here a complete philosophy of religion,
we 8hdl confine our consideration to God and values.
Coddent that the gupreme importance of God and v d u a
ia trlready admittRd by the reader or will become apparent to
him a8 the essay progressw, we ahall offer no justification for
our subject but proceed to its exposition.
We propow to examine a fundamental problem involving
both God and values: namely, the statue of God with respect
to values. Thue we hope to answer the question:-What
relation between God and values is rationally tenable?
We would by all means amid the mistake of the Ritschlians
in making their theology dependent upon a doubtful epistemology and, even worse, in proposing and dafending that epistemology to support their theolvgy. But since we are to consider the reIation of God b values, it seema incumbent upon
us to explain the epistemological criterion and the ontological
status of vaIue, Neverthela it must be beFernembered that we
are not proposing a new axiology but merely stating for h e
benefit of the d e r t h e principles which are presuppo~ed
in the prwent earsay.
Not because these principles are conto common sense
but because the u n r e M n g person uses the word 'Wue"
for such diverse meaninge, it seems advisable first of a11 to
exclude those meanings which would lead only to confusion
and misunderstanding of a11 that follom. When we u e
"vdue," it must never be interpreted to mean "utilitf or
"importance," as when one speaks of the value of his aub-

mobile; nor may it be regwded as synonym~uswith "ateemt' or "appreciation," as the value one may have for his
home or hk children. Nor hall we ever use "vaIue" in the
esonomic sense: either for "ratio of exchange" or "price,"
as when an importer wks the value of the British pound and
the value of the imported goods; or for "real equivalent" aa
when a merchant auys the vdue of an object is much greater
than ita retail price.
The word "value" h frequently wed by the contemporary
phibsopher, whether he be Idealist, Pragmatist, or Realist
But as yet, in philosophical writingsi no less than in common
usage, "value" is an smbiguow term. Henca an explicit
~tatementof what we mean by "vdue*' b not only permissible
but absoIutely necessary.
In this m a y we shall use 'Value" to mean that which,
whether a c t u d h l or not, w g M to be. Truth, goodnag,
beauty, or whatever is worthy of existence for its own s a k e
that we Elhall call a "Value." Values need not exist, but they
stre wwthg of existence and wglt h ' b e actuslkd. f n c u n b
distinction ta Value we shall d l a "13eing" that which,
whether it ought t~ or not, does exist. Thus the exact nature
of Value8 may be must easily g w p d by w n w it with
Being. Being ia that which b; Value is that which ought to
be. Thus a Being ia ReaIitg determined aa an object, whereas a VaIue is R d i * determined a~ an objective. Hence
Beings are commonly called "things," while VaIues are called
"ideaIs."
The ontological statue of Value m y be illulrtrated by an
analogue from mathematics. The mathematician apeah of
determining the vaiuue of a product, of assigming values to an
independent variable, and of desiring the a h l u t e vdue of
an unknown-meaning by "value" a determinate quantity.
We shaU use 4'Vdue'pto mean not numemial value but something which, like the number system, is not a Being, ib3 not
dependent on ern~r Being far ih d t y , b s not oacup~r
space, is indifferent to timg, and yet may be applied to or
exhibited by spati+tempord Beings. Just aa mathemata
is valid knowledge whether pme or applied, SO VaIues me
real whether actualized or not. However, Valua cannot be
isohted and m o v e d to some huwcendenhI realm. As fhat
which ought fo be, Vahe is necessarily related to the world

of Being. Thus, far from h i n g incomparable w mwdabd,
Value and Being are complementary. WQ
is not a '*
fractory duslim of two ultimate surds" but an organk

P

-

We have dehed Value as that which t worth0 of e x k h m
anduughttobeactuakd. E e n c e w e m a ~ r m m g n h ~
of Value by rr feeling of v
t ox obligation or both. But
to define Value in terms of thwe feeliwwould be as amaa ta d e b e Being in term of sight and touch.
Beings appear ta uhi through the sensm, Value3 appeal to us
thmugh the emotions. But we must learn to make valuejudgmentaI aa they are no more intuitive and spontaneoufi
than fjudgments. Specific due-judgments are empirical; but the concept "Valueue"
seem to be an a &ah
gory, making m i b 1 e our various judgmnbi.
1l we could now set forth a demtion of God from w&h
its relation ta Values could be uniquely d-ned,
our problem would be mlved. But each philosopher, W o g i s n , and
layman thinks of God in his own p d i a r way in accordance
with his own temperament and his own c u 1 W environment
The phiIoaopher and theologian & generally more acute and
d n g but no h a an individual than the layman. Their
conceptions of Gad are not only varied in expression but a h
i~compatiblein wntent. Thus any attempt at a Whet&
definition would be absurd. On the other hand, to m
p
t
blindly any am conception of God as a delinition and to d e
nouxlce aU other conceptions aa iUusory pemersiona would be
outragwu~. There is no uniqw dehition of God!
What then can be done? A great vari* of conception%
or divemity of opinions ia always diaconc&ing to the bigot
But this very multiplicity k a chdIenge to the thinker,
formal logician amand differentiah, sometima making
subtle dtbtindoms, sometimes ignoring real dZebd
hopea thereby to construct a dearat, logical dwiflcatioa
The uaud classifications of religion are made on the baerder
of either God or Vdues. Thua, according to the f-,
m
ligion is k i f i e d , quantitatively, aa mon-otheistiq porn&&,
or panthistic, and, qualitatively, as deistic or t h e i h And
on the la&x h i $ religion mag. be W e d sa "natrrrd" or
"mhric," amrdingly aa ita highest Valum ape
or
epirituaL Of mume each of them divisbm
be s m d e d

MWtely, but dl such classifications are =entially formal
and &tic.
To overcome this limitation, recent echolam have abandoned
cl-tion
for hiatury. Xllgtead of devising ingeneous BYE.terns of classification, they have busied themselves with primitive origins, hoping to discover in the h i d r y of religion
the means for ita comprehension. History
the def& of formal logic, but it adde some of its own. History
in a connected, moving process, but its order is contingent and
eEternal, Temporal sucoession may illushate but doe^ not
determine l o g i d order.
Thw, if the mullifa~usnessof theology is to be comprp.
b d e d and reduced to a rational scheme of things, a third
method muflt be employed. It m u ~ be
t l o g i d but not formal,
dynamic but not temporal-neither static classification nor
historical wuense but logical development. T f i s b d ba
our method.
Previous elatJsificatiom and histories of religion have usually tmted either God or Values as the significant dement and
subordinated all else to it. But e l k promlure is onedded and indicah the presupposition of a ptwticulax relation
between W
I and Values. NOW #oms relation, whether con14ciouslg remgnbd or not, is implicit in ever~rtheologg and
philmphy of digion; but various relations axe and have
been amerted. f e d of something to be imred or assumed undtically, the Astion between God and value^ b
ihlf a fundamental element of religious c o n v i c t i o the
~
ground of theological differences.
Tn .the 1og.Mdevelopment of the conception of God we hope
to d h v e r which relation between God and Valuea is rationally tenable. To thi~developmat we now proceed.

CHAPTER If

DEVELOPMENT
"The more erktmd relation betman man and the powem which, as
he believ* p
r
o
w him, gives way, a d the gob t k u d v m h o m e
immdiate re mtatim d the p o d a placed under their surveiHance
d o m e , indd, one with thm. - ~ . r ~ l dH0ff-t
~b * b h o i
Phihaopk.

Science d h to be knowledge of Realib; perhaps it can
furnish us with a 10anception of God. S e w bedwith "facts." It makes no assumptions; it takes nothing for
granted or on faith; it presupposes nothing-cept
Beings.
Science is knowledge of what is, of Beings. Beings just are;
things not Beings are not, are nothing. Existence, materid
existence, is rsynunymous with reality. God to be real muat
belong to the realm of Being, Science admits no qualitative
differenw. The supreme Being must be quantitatively ;4uprwne, a maximum. God to Be superior to any and every
other Being must be
THE TOTALITY OF ALL BEING.
God is thus Reality itself, neither partial nor fragmentary.
God is omnipotent and omnipresent: impersonal yet alive
with power; not limited to any time, place, or form but including .them all. This is the theological basis of PANTHEISM.
But primitive pantheism is hardly a legitimate religion. I b
"God" iP3 merely another name for the world of Beings. Worship, prayer, salvation,-none of the usual religious phenomena are m u n M for. The identifidon of God and the
totality of Being might just as well be d e d "materialism"
as '%pantheism." Thirs conception of God may be scientific
but it ia anti-religious.
But it is not really scientih. Science is not i n b r e w in
8uch all-induaive toMs. Science presupposes a world of
Beings, but it is concerned with the action of the particular
Beings within it. And as science develop it becomes not descdption but explanation. Beings are no longer dewribed a
thin@ in W v e s but explained in terms of their erurr~mding.environment or their previous ah&.
Science be
comes knowledge of muse and effect. Every Being is c a w

by aom&hing other than itself; and thia in turn, by som&
thing el=.

But what k the first cause in this r e g m a ? What ia the
ultimab caw of the whole world of Beings? Bcience as
such daes not answer them guestiom, but theology offers the
conception of God as
THE ONE TRANSCENDENT BEING.
Thus God ia distinguished from t h e wold and set apart
from the world. God is the one Being not included in the
world. God is not the conterminous sum but the exhrnal
muroe of all Beings. God is not the universe but the cause
of the univere, the first and uncaused cause. This L the
theology of DEISM.
Although this deistic conception of God is derived from
and seam h be supporbd by eence, aience really has Ida
need for that hypothesis. The d h c e of God is poduhted
as the ultimate explanation of the world, but actually it muat
be explained by the world. Intelligence is immedia*
4 aware of the Beings of this world, wheread3 the conception of a transcendent Being must be construded inferentially. The only pmpxtiea b t can be validly ascribed to
God are t h e which are implied by our prment knowledge
of the world. T h u ~instead of explaining the worId, deism
adds no new knowledge and ia an unpmvable assumption.
Nor is deiam a satisfactory basis for religion. Gwl must
be a distinct Being but not separated from the world. God
must be an object of experience and not hypostatid for
the d i e of speculative cornp~ekmsa. God's existence must
be e n or felt by the ordinary man and not eonjahred by
the ratiomdiatic philosopher, In other m d e , God must be
conceived as immanent rather tban tmmcendent
M o w e r , God's pwsem must be difFerentiaM from its
a b ~ n c e To
~ timy that everything is the work of God, to ssy
that God is the caum of sunghine and of earthquakes, of
health and of death, of happiand of adering, is to tha
svmage person nut vain talk but infamous bIasphmy. To
the religionist God must be definite. God's &ions must be
sWfic and dependable. Incondtrtent attribub cannot be
p M c a M of the =me God but may belong to difp-t
Gods.
Thu God is wnceived as

PABTICULAR BEINGS.
When God was regarded as the totali* of all Wngs in
t b world and when God was regarded as the one Being not
in the -rid, the concept was uniquely determined. But if
the concept "God" is applied to particular Beings, there must
be some wag of determining them and d i $ t h d a h i ~ Uthem
from other Beings not G&. Force, energy, or power becomes
the di~tinguhhingcharacbristic of deity. Thus I;od may
be conceived as observsble objects and phenomena or aa invisible Beings miding in or responsible for thme objects
and phenomena. The &st conception is usually called
FETISHISM and the latter ANIMISM.
These Gods may be of only momentary significance and
ehoen rather spontan~uslyor haphazardly, or they may r e p
resent serious and deliberate selection. They may be ammiated with the spasmodic or variable phenomena of nature,
as the winds and rain, or with the more speckcular manifestations of power, as thunder and lightning, or even with
the-regular and reourrent phenomena, m the sun, the moon,
and the stars. Moreover, the Gods may be animate or inanimate, pemnal or impersonal, natural or eupernaturd.
How then is fetishism or animism any more aatiefahry
than ambiguitg uf deism and the heterogeneity of pantheism? What gives a particular Being religious significance?
The answers to these questions are respectively the recognition of and the influence on Values. To
religious person Vdues are j u d aa real a;s Beingrj, but mither deism nor
materialistic pantheism recognizes the validitg of Vduee.
Thus while historically much later, they must be regarded as
lower shg& of religion-i.e., as less religious-than fetishism and animism.
Man h
i great respect for certain Values and great anxiety
for their exishce. A powerful Being may have power not
only over other Beings but also over Values. Hen* whab
ever Being he regards as influencing or controlling these
V a l u e a t Being he calls a Goti and endeavors to propitiate.
Thus the ultimate concern of religion has been calIed the
tion on of valuee" and the statue of God regarded as
the agemy by which this mmewation is effected. But the
word "eonmation" implies the p m m t i o n of something
already existing, wbererrs Valuea need not exist and digton

is d b n conclemed with Value that have never &.
Re
l s o n is not conservative but cmtive. The religiom d o t
Wm not that the amount of Value in the world will alwa~rs
be cunstant but that it will continue to grow, c o m t l y b8nacendiag its previous d m u m . Thus he invoke8 the Gods
not for the "conservation" but for the "actudizati~n'~
of hie
Value&
We my ?hie" not bemuse Values are subjective whims because man identifies himself with them and devotes hie- life
to their actualhtiirn. Each individual may invoke a separate
God whom he regards as having unique control over his
Valua, or he may with others placate a whole pantheon of
Gods, But as man broadens and becumea more explicit in
his evaluationa, he recognizes the univemdity of certain
Values. All the membem of a family, a clan, a tribe, or a
nation may unite in recognizing the valuableness of a d i n
o b j a Then why must each person appeal to his own Gad?
There muat be a particular God whose function it is h~actualize that particular Value. And likewise, there must be
Gods for other Values. Thus man recogniz;es in Vdue something more important and more ultimately real than his own
individuditg. The pIuralism of individualism is transcended
by the pluralism of Values.
The God8 are no longer regarded aa powem indifferent to
their utilization by man, but the Gods themselves take particular interest in the Values over which they have influen=
The Gods as much as or more than men are concerned about
the actualization of Values and share with them that responsibility. The Gods are regarded as fellow workers with men.
Thus man may even have the feeling of kinship with particuIar Gods aa in TOTEMISM.
As the Gods are chosen and designated according to the
particular Value8 with which they me w&W, they
gradually b m e identifid with them. The Go& remain
powerful Beings, but they demand more and more that consideration which at k& only the Values m f v d . mey
come ends as well a~ means in the actualhtion of Vduw.
They m e to mifyor embody those Values which they enh v o r aCtuali%in the world. Thus the Gads a n no longer
~ E Ie ~ n d v e d
as mera Beinga but are mw

-

I

PARTICULAR VALUE-BEINGS.
Thus the signihnce of the Gads bas i n d kernendou~ly. Instead of being firvomble or unfavorable i d u e s
b be invoked or plwted by man, the Guds now command

hia respect and demand hh emulation. Man's aftitude toward
the Gods now combines admiration and loyal@ with cooperation. This stage of religious development and theological
formulation is usually known ars POLYTHEISX But tha
tramition from fetishism, animism, and totemism is m d ual and yet so inevitable that they too may be considered primitive forms of polytheism.
These polytheistic Gods-thew VdueBeings-are autonomous and self-sufficient, They are no longer powers that need
man's direction, for each God ia itself a Value. Nor do t h ~
need man's assistance to make them actual, for each God h
also a Being, But as Beinp they 81% powerful and active.
Each God would overpower the othem ; each God would make
his Value supreme. Each God commands obeisance to his
Value; each God d e w & submission to his power. Instead
of being free to invoke the aid of whatever Gods he will
man is now a slave of the Gods. He is oppressed by their
power and distracted by their conflktkg daima for his
loyalty. The pantheon becomes a camp of warring factions l
But, fortumteIy, war always wks ita own termination and
would eventually destroy itaeIf. There are, moreover, two
alternative solutions: one wnktant may be found superior
to the other~l,or dl cantestanka may be EonciliaM. A military conflict may end either with a v i d r y or with a truce.
S i m i k l y in this theological strife, one God may be decared
trnperior t o the mt, or ta more fundamental principle may Im
found which will unite the various W. But since thew
Gods are ValueReinga, one God may be judged superior either
on the baais of power or Value or both. Thus man may 1Jet
up rr hierarchy of Gods ranked according to their imputed
power, or aooording to the n h t i v e worth of the Value gymb o l i d . But the inferior Gode gradually Iose their signscane, b m h g subwvient and tending to disappear dbether. Likewise if the other alternative is followed, the
underlying unity, #e m o n identity, disphcea the individual
Gods and undermines their petty contlicta. Thus in either case
the pluraIits is abmrbed and God ie-conceived aar

TELE SUPREME VALUE-BEING.
God b now uniquely determined as a u p m e . God ia the
supreme Being, more powerful than any other. God ie the
supreme Value, more worthy than m y other. As a Value,
God is to be respected and emulated, worshipped and semed.
As a Being, God dire& and controIs the processes of life.
God is single ;but thia may be regarded as "one among ma&'
or u "one and only." The former conception may be called
mNOTETEISM and the latter MONOTHEISM. Thw hen*
€heism and monotheitsm correspond to the alternative hnaitions from polytheism. But the distinction is rather subtle;
hence any belief in one supreme VdueBeing is commonly
d d monotheistic.
A great many people seem to take the monotheistic conception for granted whenever God is mentioned. But it is not
nearly so clear and definib a concept ad3 they might suppose.
It is derived from polytheism and long xetains vmtigerr of that
stage, Particularly is this true of what we have called hen*
theism. God may be regarded as a wlitary worker n d ing man's coqxration or as an a g m i v e leader requiring
man'a subservience. God m y be vague and undefined or
definitely anthropomorphic. God may be immanent in the
world or may inhabit a transcendental empyrean. But Gad
is the embodiment a€ Value, whose cause he champions in
the world.
We might mention here an snomaloun development that
is o w n found in connection with or in p h of henotheism.
In the emergence from polytheism, the power of the Gcda
may seem not to be pmportional to the relative worth of the
Values they represent. This may lead to Wdtschmm or even
despondent pessimism. On the other hand, instead of one
hierarchy of Gods- or one dominant God, there may be twboth approximately equal in powex, but one positive and the
other negative with respect to V a l u ~ . Thus the c W c
strife of polytheism i~ preserved in a dualistic druggle. Just
why these two h n d a are taken and just how long they are
mepted seems to depend upon the temperament of the in-.
dividual or the environmental circumstances. The normal person or the stable cigIization soon trawcends this s
f it
is touched upon at all. But unfortunately the mnfimed
dualist and the thoroughgoing rninmist are usually very

dogrnstic about their view8 and very stubborn about changing them.
Genuine monothei~meither absorl~or ignore8 aa superficial any .apparent lack of harmony. God is now defined aa
the supreme Value-Being. Heme its superiority
been
attained either by surpassing the power of all other Beings or
by transcending the worthinaa of all other Valuee. As distinguishing from henotheism, God is no longer thought of as
the acme of a hierarchy. God i~ unique; God is incomparable.
Thus monetheism is the climax approached by henotheiam.
But once this point has been reached by the religionist, he
readily slides over into pantheism. Man ier prone to conceive
God m a maximum, a tow. God muat be in every Being;
God mwt embody every Value. God is all-powerful and allworthy. God is

THE ALLINCLUSIVE VALUE-BEING.
God is unconditioned and self-bluflicient-"The Absolute."
God &me haa independent existence. God alone is entirely
worthy of existence. Every Being is s part of God, a fragmentarry element of the divine whole. Every Value is an
aspect of God, a partial indication of the eompleb deity. This
is "HIGHER PANTHEISM."
This higher pantheism has rratiafied many sophisticated
thinkers to whom monotheism and polytheism were but little
more than supemtitions. Science and religion are now reconciled; the philosopher may speak of God without blushing;
the reality of God may be proved-duch are the claim made by
the rationaligtic adherents of higher pantheism! Thia theological conviction has even been formulated as a lilystem of
metaphy~icsand thus become the cornerhne of a distinct
aebool of thought.
Nor has higher pantheism been completely lacking in emotional appeal : nineteentheentury literature beam witness to
that. But in general, the gain in intellectual tenability has
been accompanied by a loas in genuine religious signiihnca
One may find God in the innmnce of the little child md the
W o r n of the erage, the simple beauty of a wild flower and
the
splendor of a sun&. But the religious person
rebels at attnibuting to God ignorance, stnpidiy, deformity, w
dkord. Nor does undifferentiated Being evoke religious aen-

timents. God cannot be in everything alike; yet R d t g is
the whole, and only the whole can be proved real. Thus a
d,isbincidon is made: there are degrsm of Reality. God ia
&tillidentical with the whole of Reality, but the whole is no
Zonger thought to be homogeneoue.
However, thb new pi- of reasoning tacked on to patch up
the flaw in pantheism rally makes that defect more conspicuous. God cannot be the allinclusive Value-Beingl. God
may be found in some things but not in d things. Mere
existence as such has no signilicance for religion. To identify
God with all that is, is meaningless. God must be diatinct
and diatingui~hablefrom ordinary existence. But through
rigorous intellectual application, science has discovered a unity
and a uniformity among Beings which no intelligent pemon
would ignore in his conception of God. Science investigates
rrIZ existence, and its explanation leavea no place for the interpolation of a u n w e Being called "God." Thus the &&nee
of God as a Being is ultimaMy untenable.
Unfortunately, the penon who reasons thusly in a conmientious effort to rid theology of spurious notions is i m d ably branded an "atheist" But to deny the adequacy of a
particular theoIogical dogma is not a denid of the realitg of
God. An adequate conception of God must satisfy emotional
as well as intellectual prerequisites, The existence of God may
be precluded by scientific knowIedge of all Beinga, but science
claims no knowledge of Values. Religiou~lexperience is here
the soIe authority. As it is purified and purged of fears and
fancies, the emotiona demand that God be absolutely worthy
of existence whether or not an existent Being. G d m a y
atill appear in all the manifestations of Vdue, but God must
not include Beings of no Value. Furthermom, tlre d*
of
I30d eEtends beyond the particular Beings in which it ia
manife~tand does not depend on any Being. Thus God ia
conceived no longer a5 the dl-inclusive Valuel3eing but now as

THE TOTALITY OF ALL VALUE.
Religion seems primrib concerned with Values and their
actualization. God has been conceived as means for this acl
tudizatbn (as Being) and as a combination of means and
actualization (as Valu+Eeing), but none of them? VILF~OEZB
comxptiona have k e n ultimlrtely satisfactory. Thua it is in-

evitab1e that God be conceived ss the VaIuea themaelve~.But
fistaridb this ~ t e pbaa heen taken only hesitantlg. The
conception of God as the totality of all Value 31rather recent.
As yet, it has not been acceped by a religious inntitution.
However, it haa h n proffered and m p t e d by variou8 members of P contemporary school of philosophy-but not SUBciently to warrant ita identiflation with the name of that
Bchool.
NOWthe totality of Values seems to be quite differ& *rn
the totaIity of Being. We are quite accustomed t o speaking and
thinking of the totali@ of all beings as "the world" or "the
univer~,"the latter term showing clearly the unity d the
whole. Likewirre, the conception of the dl-inclusive ValueBeing, ''the Absolute," ia a unified idea, having developed from
the notion of a single Value-Being. But the totality of Values,
on the other hand, mm €o lack a corresponding unity.
Vdues do not form a homogeneous plenum; nor are we so
thomughly convinced of the network of relatiom and the
mutual interdependence of Values as of Beings. Thus, while
we may speak of a total, we almost invariably think of Values
individually. Thus the totality of Valuea breaks down into s
plurali*. Hence God ia conceived not aa the to&lity of dl
Value but aa

PART1CUI;AR VALUES.
Each Value ia sepamte and distinct, quite independent of all
other Valum. Each claims absolute validib for itself; each
claim8 unconditional reaped and uncompromising loyalty
from man.
But the various Values cannot be coordinated. However
worthy each may seem when conaidered abshctly, .in concrete ~ituationssome of these Values must be wrifIced, It
i~ impossible to give equal deferenoe to all Values. Selection and discrimination must be made, This estimation m y
be achauative and final or conditional and provisional. The
former procedure would determine s f m d scale of Vdues;
the latter would presuppose a "fundamental value universal,"
an uncondikional standard of all Valuea. Thew two alternatives correspond to the alternative transitions from polytheism to monotheism, introducing unity into plurality. Thus
the discmtenw and rivalry of the distinct V d u a disappear#.
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Specific vktum md isolated Values lose their individual Imgo&
T h u ~God annot be particular VaIues but rather
PURE VALrn-PERFECTION.
Particular Values have absolute validity no more than
particular Beinga have independent existence. But Perfection
is absolute and independent. Particular Valuea may be ordered as better and worse, higher and lower; but '~bettern~~s"
is not the -ntial
eharateristic of Valua. Their relative
worth ia secondary and derivative. Pedecion is the very
exwm of Value, the abmlute standard according to which
all things are evaluated.
Thua God ia unique and inimitable. Ethics may be codified a8 the decalogue; morality may be confined to the performance of certain ads or the ab~tinencefrom c e d n
others; virtue may be reduced to three, four, or seven abstract quJitim;-but God cannot be circumscribed. God is
restricted to particular i d a b and particular duties no mom
than ta specific times and places. God transcends all particularity. God ie not the quantiktive total of a11 Values but the
one ultimate Vdue, Perfedion. God is the one ideal, abmlub
and unconditional. Particular Valuea are concrete particularizatiom of this ideal. Gc-d is pure Vdue.

"Tltii ia whst 1 worship when I worthi Go$ ff I t d y nnderstaad
~ h . It M about: I WOW^ th. .porn
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T h P M b h of Immortality.
The purpw of thh essay was to determine the relation
between God and Values. But a unique solution being grecIuded by the lack of unanimity in the conception of
we
have examined, as impartially as possible, each of the various doctrines, noting q ~ ~ M the
1 ystatuu of f Godwith reapect to Vdues. Considering. thae diverse conceptions not
aar isolated revelations or random gumsea but as stew in a
logioal development, we have endeavored to e x h a d ail pas
dble types of theology. But no attempt was made ta label
and catalogue the particular conceptions of individuds or
cults. W e have confined our consideration to logical poet
dbilities and left the reader to decide which b p e his own

a,

conception of God illustrates. Even though his id= of God
may include vestiges and rudiments of differing I o g i d types,
by examining them and thinking through to their mndusion
the tendencies implicit In them, he can discover for himself

the l o g i d maition to a "higher," more adequate conception
of God.
In this manner we have found the onIy tenabIe relation between God and Values--thua solving our original problemand at the same time we have evolved a xational conception
of God. For until we reached the conception of God as P m
Value, each Qpe of theology was successively found inadequate
and ultimately untenable.
To this doctrine of God a~ the one and only ultimate Value
we have given the name "axiologi~theology:' Of course
8uch an epithet is merely tentative: when the majority of
people think of God as Perfect VaIue and nothing but Value,
the qualification, "axiological," will be superfluous. But for
the prewnt we must maintain the distinction between axiological thenJogy and all other eonceptiom of God.
Heretofore, our treatment has h e n a aequacious develop
ment mther than an argument Qd him We have striven for univmlity and rationality, completely dimegarding
traditional and contemporary beliefti. But now t?mt our con-

elusions b v e been reached, it will not he out of p b .to conh a t them with current theological notions, thus making more
evliAent the superior feasibility of d o 1 o g i d thealogjr.
The &ce
of evil has long been the bugaboo of orthodox
monotheism. If God cannot prevent evil, he must be limited
in power or knowledge or both. If Gad can prevent it but
doesn't, he is morally responsible and unworthy of being God.
In fact any of these alternatives is fatal to a theology which
proclaims an omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent God.
But this dilemma d m not implicate axiological theology. Its
God is not s pre+xistent creator but an eternal ideal. God determinea not what the world is but what it ought to be. Perfection cannot be responsible for i m p e r P d n . Thus the erti s b m of evil is no atigma on the character of God and no
i-se
for axiological theolog~r.
Moreover, axiobgieal theology givw morality relidow sanction and incentive. The God of axiological theology is not an
autocrat stultifying human endeavor but an ideal inspiring
it. Melioration is not only a possibility but a religiow d u e .
Science mag discover uniformiw in nature and even speak
of the inexorable law of cause and efpeet, but man ie continually adapting and utiLizing the f o w of nature to ~ubaerve hirr own ends, to a c t u d h certain Valuea. The world
is not a completed product, deaigned and executed by an omnipoknt, arbitrary Being. It is up to UB-religiouht men and
women-to make the universe divine, to make God universaI 1
It might seem that without an omnipotent Being to assure
just rewards and punishments, momlity would have m incentive and religion m significance. But surely no codentious person could think that an act done from hope of reward
or fear of punishment is an instance of morality or that the
function of God is to encourage such a&.
The God of axiological theology ia a motivating ideal. No
one can really worship Perfection without striving tO become perfect in thought, word, and deed. Consequently &oloffical theology p r w c r i h no specific ethical duties and m
quires neither prodee nor threats as added in*-$
for morality, Its only command is the categorical immrrtive :
-Do the perfect thing in every dmmstancet
Now Perfation is no new tern to be applied to God. For
centuries Chtistianity hm proclaimed the Perfection of God

andof Godalone. ~ u t m a n h a s c l u n g t o t l a e n o t i o n o f ~
aa 8 Being. God 1s said to be the Perfect Bedng, the
m d only Being that is Perfect However, as we have aL
r a y m n , this conception is not subdanthted by achd
perlenae and is mponaible for rr gxeat msny of the ib&d
theories and unremonabb d i l e m m that have di-d
U
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God is-continudly r e f 4 to a#$
the "heavenly Father." To what extent this epithet is m&
aphorid we dare not say. Perhap neither Jaua nor ang
of the New Tssibmat writers ever dto think of God tur
a Being, as the Supreme Vdue-Being. But no one can d a q
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that the most authentic and the m o ~ characteristic
t
tmwhhgp
of Jesus proclaim the ethical perfection of God as an ideal

for man! Adologid theology merely renders thia dockhe
mow explicit by ita complete identification of God and P w f e
tion.
APPENDIX
Pmen-y
scholasticism h d h h to d l any piece of work
~~srholarly"
unless there k appended to it an exbuative bibb
ography. Hence a large bibliography is often added for iJ
own sake, both for the aheer impmmiveness of she and for
the magiw1 touch lent by the namea of a few authorithx
On the other hand, we hope there will be some redm sufflciently aroueed by the above three &aptem really to a m ate a few suggestion^ for eollahxd reading. But believing
aa we do, that m y doctrine ~houldstand on ita own rationall*
rather than on the authority of cited authors, and %hata
long bibliography would be confounding to the layman and
unnewssary for the scholar, we shall not conform to the ooaventiod g-ure.
The religious-minded reader is bewildered by the had
overwhelming number of book and artidea claiming his attention. But the only ones worth reading lrre thm which
wiU help the reader to And or, if already found, to p m
serve a rational conviction of his own and at the wmw tInae
to develop or, if already developed, to maintain as inWig&
tolerance of other mnWona. Bigotry and c o m p l h lack d
conviction are the two extremes that must be avoided. (&a&

here we must remember that big0Q.g is not
dth,
or limited b, orkbadoxy, Ths dogmatic anthropoIogid who,
p i e c ' i together d e o h g i d discovery and imagit18tive inf e p e t m , annoueeea that modern rdigiw ia the vestige of a
primitive wpomse to an unfriendly mvitoment; the rodld
modernist who, denouncing 811 else M auptmtitioua accwtion,
prmIaimrr his most recently acquired tenet be the primeval
essence of dl religionare only two examph of the
bigotry now competing with orthodow.)
Modern man is in need of a Modern thmlogy. He who
would supply It must interpret religion as he w e it, but he
muat also allow for interprhtions Mering from hki own.
Thia we have k i e d to do; but it haa a h been done by Miss
France Power Cobbe and, to a e
n exkit, by Dr. Charles
Carroll Everett, Both d them are unequivocal In pointing out
what they consider the Mghest and bat; yet both of them
recognize the diametrically opposite position and grant a gradual development fmm it to the more advanced point of view,
As the present w a y was nearing completion, our attention
was attracted to an article entitld 'The Two Religions," written by Mias Cobbe and appearing in the C&pmw
Rmim
of December 1890.l While expressed in a d i f f m t temfnology and treated in a diEerent manner, thier article in
is idmtid with wr own.
The thesis of the art%cIe i~stated in the f i a t W n c e :
"The rellgiona of mankind, homoever variously
classifled as Natural or Rev&,
H&kn or Chrie
tian, Monotheidic or Polptheiutilc, are, morrrllyl of
two orders only; m e 1 4 e womW of PO'lirYER,
and the worship of GO DNESS,"
These two "orders," and their variow m d h t i o n s and cumbinationar, are then dearly illustrated by &tiom from the
sacred scriptures and goetic classics of ancient Egypt, India,
Pergia, Greece, and Rome.
Mhs Cobbeyee ~ ~ r n p l eare
a concrete and show the W t a
eff& of the conception of God on personal conduct, eccleui&id organization, and other manifwbti0118 of religion
which we had to neglect She d m not give a
logical
development as wa have attempted in Chapter 11; but her insight into the "Whhistorical rdigiom*' ia so clear, her ahtemed
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of it so simple, and her plea for the worship of
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Pillacing I
In a courrw of lectwea given at Harvard, Dr. Everett mM
to classify religion on the M a of pnychdogid
m a t a Thia cWi0~~1tbon
consisted in grouping the d m
attitudeti or 'Yeehga'' which have been mcombd aa re&&
ow, under tbree gen&
hen8ing;s: namely, "aelfa-,"
Udivf&d," and "Weentered." But even though his
concern warr the paych$ogy of religion, Dr. Everetfn M
fold clsenIhtfon k in ementiaI agreement with out own
-hat
of the d e v t l o p n t of the wncep~onof W
The first stage ir the relidon of one! "who seeks his own
good," wboae relation to God "is that of expectation d ~lofge
s h w , or of recognition of a service which baa been perr

formed.''
"The wursbipger regards himself ae the centre,
and appeals to the divinity to help him in tb a&
Wment of the apecia1 ends which he baa at heart, or
to deliver him *om evib whlch he wiahw to avoid.*9
Nothing could be c l - ~ !
God is 4 Being, endowed with
p o w . Man wpda certain Values (''@at
ends which be
hars rtt heart"). Unaware of Ma own p6wer and not yet the
mmtm of the power of .nabre, m m appeals to God
the
a d a l h t i o n of these Valnw. God is not valued except as an
agency in the actualization of Val-.
God ier not w d p p d l
fdr w h t it is, but praised fOT what it baa done. The worshipper say#, "not 'How gaad God ia!' but 'How good G d W
been to me!'"
In the w n d h g e , lh.Everett continua, "the wor&jg
per begins to LW that the divinity has ne& of ita o m ta
which the wornhippet ought to yield; he begim b
the rightfulneaa of the moral and divine law."' In
words God ia no longer an indifferent power to be coru'ured
up for the securing of wants. God is more than a dhintmmk
ed Being to be invoked for the tion on of Values. God
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is atill a powerful Being but B now identified Hth certain
Mniie Values ("needs of its own").
Dr. Everett rightly observes that this second stage 4 k k s
tha development of the worshipper out of the Iower into tbe
higher forms of the religiow life." But on the whole he
seema not to realize its &me significance. He speaks of it
aa '~ychologicalrather than historid," but its historical
embodiment has been f a r - r d n g . It if+, of mure, merely
a kamitionaI stage; but how many people even W a y are
content to remain in it!
he b t stage in the c u ~ m t i o n
of the whole aiveloP-t.
"In the third group of feelinga God I8 the centre,
and the worsbipm not only feeln and r e c o g n h the
supremacy of the diviniw, but mjoica in it"'
The self#nteW desire and adoration of the first atage haw
now become the Godcentered love and woriship of the third.
Seemingly without realizing the denouncement of Mt i 0 4 theism implicit in his &ternen&, Dr. Everett speaks
of love and wonhip of God "not for what he hae done for
the worshipper but for whut he b in hhwelf,'* "not beesuse
he baa brought help to the womhipger8but b u m he iar himself worthy of wornhip." The truth implied in t h e m
marka i8 that God must now be regarded not as a Being but
as Value. W e may fear OF bust, mnciliak or pdae, nub
mit to or invoke a God conceived as a Being ;but Value alone
can be the object of h e worehip!
Thus Dr. EvereWr claararificationPof religiow -f
as (1)
~eIfantered,(2) divided, and (3) Godcentem? is W payCholodcal counterpart of the ldd development of the conaption of Gad fmm Being, through VdueBeihg, to pure

Value.

lilbia pp. 11%118.
THE END.

